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Abstract 
 
Security certification processes for information 
systems involve expressing security controls as 
functional and non-functional requirements, monitoring 
deployed mechanisms that satisfy the requirements, and 
measuring the degree of confidence in system 
compliance. With the potential for systems to perform 
runtime self-adaptation, functional changes to remedy 
system performance may impact security control 
compliance. This impact can extend throughout a 
network of related controls causing significant 
degradation to the system’s overall compliance status. 
We represent security controls as security assurance 
cases and implement them in XML for management and 
evaluation. The approach maps security controls to 
softgoals, introducing achievement weights to the 
assurance case structure as the foundation for 
determining security softgoal satisficing levels. 
Potential adaptations adjust the achievement weights to 
produce different satisficing levels. We show how the 
levels can be propagated within the network of related 
controls to assess the overall security control 
compliance of a potential adaptation. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
With the emergence of autonomous systems, 
multiple domains seek to exploit the potential benefits 
of allowing systems to make dynamic decisions and 
repairs at runtime. These systems may craft adaptations 
from internal resources [2, 4], from an external source 
like a cloud [23], or from machine learning or genetic 
algorithms [14] applied to existing code or historical 
execution traces. Security-critical systems need 
additional assurances that self-adaptation will not 
compromise their compliance with security constraints. 
Assurance cases represent structured claims and 
arguments for those claims, crafted in the form of 
subclaims, strategies for satisfying the arguments, and 
evidence related to the strategies [8]. Assurance cases 
[22] are a tool for documenting how a system satisfies 
its requirements. An assurance case contains a root 
claim or goal stating a requirement, along with an 
argument indicating why the claim of compliance with 
the requirement should be trusted. An assurance case 
argument, structured as a tree, links the goal to subgoals 
and ultimately traces each subgoal to supporting 
evidence. Assurance cases are commonly represented 
using a graphical notation called Goal Structuring 
Notation (GSN) [11]. Security assurance cases have 
been used to focus on the acceptability of a security 
solution to known vulnerabilities. They may be domain-
specific, given that certain types of systems and domains 
have known threat vectors. The overall objective is to 
determine the evidence to support threat mitigation [16].  
Security controls are part of the compliance 
requirements for US federal information systems found 
in the NIST SP800-53 [19]. The 800-53 also outlines 
how organizations determine which security controls 
are relevant to their systems. Subsets of these controls 
have been extended to multiple domains. For example, 
any nonfederal business receiving Controlled 
Unclassified Information from a US government entity 
must show that they have a process in place to comply 
with the NIST SP800-171 [21], which contains a subset 
of the 800-53. Thus, understanding security controls and 
how to certify compliance is becoming a normal part of 
doing business with the US government. Certification 
requires that there are mechanisms deployed to ensure 
security control effectiveness for those controls 
necessary for secure system operation. Some level of 
risk is acceptable as part of the certification process, 
leading to different levels of system trustworthiness. 
Assurance cases for security controls should allow for 
the representation of these trustworthiness levels. 
Information systems that can self-adapt their 
functionality, communication, and decision-making 
processes during runtime increase the burden of 
determining compliance with security requirements. 
The challenge is to determine how a functional change, 
not necessarily made for security reasons, can impact 
security control certification, and provide additional 
reasoning on whether to proceed with an adaptation. 
In this paper, we express 800-53 security controls as 
functional and non-functional requirements by 
extending an initial security assurance case template 
[17]. We use the extended template to determine how a 
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 functional adaptation that locally affects one security 
control can propagate to other security controls, 
reducing overall compliance confidence. The new 
template incorporates metadata from the security 
controls that detail what the control provides to and 
requires from predefined related controls, forming a 
network of dependencies among the controls.  
We use the concept of network vulnerability metrics  
[24] to calculate achievement weights of subclaims 
(subgoals) that support each security assurance case 
claim (root goal). By expressing the security assurance 
case claims as softgoals [5], we adapt an existing 
algorithm [12] to measure the satisficing level of each 
security control and its impact on its related security 
controls in the network based on its local achievement 
weight. Because we allow adaptations to be configured 
at runtime, the change operation that the system 
performs may cause a reduction in the achievement 
weights associated with the subgoals, requiring a 
recalculation of the satisficing level at the root goal and 
throughout the network. We demonstrate the approach 
with a sample application, showing how the 
achievement weights and satisficing levels compare to 
the implementation of each potential adaptation defined. 
 
2. Related Work  
 
An assurance case evolution technique has been 
proposed using a model management approach [13]. 
with the objective of maximizing the reuse of assurance 
case components when evolution invalidates part of an 
assurance case. This framework provides an algorithm 
that identifies reusable components of an assurance case 
and relies on human intervention to correct branches 
that are not found to be reusable. Other exploration in 
evolving assurance cases considers the problem of 
checking the quality of a new assurance case that 
replaces a faulty assurance case once a flaw is detected 
[6, 7]. The approach represents flaws in the original 
assurance case using a formal problem model and can 
determine which of the problems are resolved by the 
new assurance case. Our work differs in its approach 
and several of its assumptions. We do not assume the 
availability of a set of flaw descriptions for the original 
assurance case, but instead assume that an impact 
assessment of the potential adaptations is provided that 
can be used to dynamically calculate achievement 
weights of the affected subgoals. 
Assurance case quality evaluation has also been 
studied by Lin et al. [15]. Their approach assigns 
confidence levels to claims in assurance cases. It relies 
on the existence of a known, valid assurance case, and 
computes confidence levels for other assurance cases 
based on both metrics of similarity to the valid assurance 
case and the Dempster-Shafer theory for uncertain 
reasoning. We similarly assign numeric weights to main 
goals in the form of satisficing levels, and our approach 
also propagates achievement weights from child goals 
to parent goals. In contrast, we consider specific issues 
associated with security assurance cases for NIST 
security controls, such as the existence of control 
enhancements and related controls that propagate and 
affect networked compliance scores. 
Lipson [16] states that the credibility of an assurance 
case depends on incorporating appropriate evidence into 
the argumentation. Failure to organize appropriate 
evidence may weaken the argument, because at a low 
level the argument is linked with its evidence. 
Organizing the evidence involves an understanding of 
claims (compliance goals), system context, system 
enablers (dependencies) and potential threats. The 
approach relies on a framework [8] to categorize 
security property evidence for the argument and a 
template to help evaluate the quality of evidence. 
Security certification can be a useful technique for 
maintaining stable security behavior, because 
certification schemes involve evaluation of the system 
by considering security claims and evidence. A security 
certification framework for a cloud-based system is 
proposed to verify security certificate validation [1, 2]. 
In this framework, a certification model template and 
instance are developed, and probes are deployed to 
collect evidence about system consistency. 
Inconsistencies are listed, and adaptations can be 
triggered based on the misconfiguration report. 
Chung and Nixon  [5] designed a non-functional 
requirement (NFR) expression framework, in which 
they represent NFRs as “softgoals” and use the concept 
of “satisficing” to measure softgoal achievement. 
Satisficing provides a degree of satisfaction for a 
softgoal based on positive or negative evidence. It has 
been used to bridge nonfunctional and functional 
requirements by analyzing the interdependencies 
between them and provide insights for conflict analysis 
[18]. The framework defines a Softgoal Inter-
dependency Graph (SIG) by decomposing the softgoals 
into subgoals based on AND/OR relationships over 
which a satisficing algorithm is performed. To 
quantitatively evaluate the SIG, a process called 
“Softgoal using Weight” (SGW) is deployed [12]. The 
SIG leaves are operational subgoals that assigned 
achievement weights by a subject matter expert based 
on the contribution value of the subgoal attribute to the 
parent goal. A satisficing algorithm uses the propagation 
of the achievement weights to quantify the impact the 
attributes have on the high-level goal.  
Satisficing would be more applicable to a self-
adaptive system if achievement weights could be 
calculated at runtime. One approach is to determine a 
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 quantitative vulnerability metric based on a defined 
community structure of a complex weighted network 
[24]. The community is defined as subnetwork of several 
nodes connected with a high degree of strength. Using 
hierarchical agglomerative algorithm (HAA), a 
community can be detected, along with its connections 
with other communities, to quantify vulnerability. The 
vulnerability metric depends on number and strength of 
external connections with other communities, the 
degree of dependency on other communities, and the 
internal (within a community) connection density and 
strength.  The internal strength serves as primary factor 
for measuring vulnerability, which denotes the impact 
of the connection’s weight on the community. It is this 
measure that can be used for an achievement weight. 
 
3. NIST Security Controls 
 
For the security assurance cases, we use the NIST 
SP800-53 [19] (called 800-53) security controls as 
shown in Figure 1. A security control associates a title 
with each identifier. AU-4 refers to the 4th control within 
the Audit family of controls. The actor is either the 
information system or the organization. The control 
statement follows the actor designation. It may be a 
single statement, like AU-4, or separated into distinct 
parts, like AU-5(a) and AU-5(b). The statement can 
contain a mix of functional and non-functional 
requirements. Tailoring, a major part of security control 
certification, is performed when the organization 
instantiates what is required by the [Assignment: …] for 
the information system under consideration.   
The related controls infer a dependency relationship 
among the controls. For AU-5, they are AU-4 and SI-
12. There are other controls that tag AU-5 as a related 
control, such as AU-4, with different dependencies. The 
relationships may be tightly coupled, where AU-5 relies 
on the audit storage capacity determined in AU-4, or 
loosely coupled, where AU-4 provides AU-5 with a 
parameter it obtains from its related control AU-11. 
These inter-dependencies can be used to assess the 
impact of a self-adaptation on not just a single security 
control, but on the network of security controls. AU-
5(1) is a control enhancement, which provides 
additional specification decisions and constraints. The 
related controls can be inherited from the main control 
or the enhancement can have its own related controls 
that are not shared with the main control. Controls are 
assigned to a baseline set related to the impact on the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the system if 
a breach occurs. For example, AU-5 appears in the 
baseline set for moderate impact, while AU-5(1) 
appears in the baseline set for high impact systems. 
Figure 1. Security Controls AU-4, AU-5, and AU-5(1) 
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Figure 2. AU-5(1) Assessment Guidelines 
 
The NIST SP800-53A [20], companion to the 800-
53, provides assessment guidelines for each security 
control. Figure 2 shows the guidelines for AU-5(1). 
Notice that it dissects the security control statement into 
evaluative portions, providing distinct labels for each 
portion. We use both the security control and its 
guidelines to create and instantiate a security assurance 
case for a specific information system using GSN.  
 
4. Sample Application  
 
We demonstrate security assurance case expression, 
evolution, and satisficing evaluation on a sample Smart 
Inventory Management System (SIMS). The 
architecture is shown in Figure 3. The components 
operate concurrently, each with their own MAPE-K 
(monitor-analyze-plan-execute-knowledge) loop which 
is a common control loop to perform self-adaptation. 
Measure collects sensor data and emits a local signal 
indicating if the current reading is outside a defined 
threshold. The sensor readings are passed to Process, a 
cloud service, that adjusts the sensor threshold based on 
the received readings. Measure and Process create audit 
records that are sent to Audit’s message queue, which 
then stores them in an audit trail. 
The process flow for SIMS appears in Figure 4. 
Process flow understanding is needed because it is 
possible to formally express the low-level functionality 
that is part of a security control and directly prove the 
implementation complies with it [17]. A formal proof 
can be part of the argument needed within a security 
assurance case as described in the next section.  
 
Figure 3. SIMS Architecture 
 
 
Figure 4. SIMS Audit Component Processes 
The MAPE-K loop in each component monitors for 
anomalies in the system and activates the planner to 
generate an adaptation. The checkCongestion process in 
Figure 4 provides the monitor with information about 
the input queue. Imagine that the monitor has received a 
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 certain pattern of information from checkCongestion 
that causes it to invoke the analyze phase. Here it is 
determined that the input queue is filling too rapidly for 
Audit, but that Measure and Process are not the 
problems. The planner configures three potential 
adaptations.  
A1: Increase the capacity ratio limit, delaying the 
generation of an audit trail capacity alert. 
A2: Introduce a new storage buffer and alter Audit to 
offload older records in its audit trail to the new 
buffer.  
A3: Change Audit to overwrite old records and 
disable capacity alert within the same audit trail.  
We return to these adaptations after introducing the 
assurance cases for the security controls. 
 
Figure 5. GSN Template for  
Security Assurance Case 
 
5. Creating Security Assurance Cases  
 
Given that 800-53 security controls have a similar 
structure as in Figure 1, we extend a basic GSN template 
[10] to allow for dependency and achievement weight 
expressions as shown in Figure 5. We instantiate the 
security assurance cases from the template using an 
approach found in [9]. The 800-53A directs the 
expansion of the assurance case into subgoals, context 
elements, and strategies for each control. Evidence can 
be formulated by multiple means, such as testing, model 
checking, and proof. We express the template in XML, 
based on CertWare [3] but without the use of its display 
facilities to allow for more coding flexibility.  
In Figure 5, the root goal is the main security control 
with attributes that coincide with the labeling and 
control statement (Figures 1 and 2). The impact baseline 
allocation is provided. The “provides” attribute holds 
the provision set of state variables and conditions that 
are part of the mechanisms needed for compliance with 
the security control. This set flows through a 
SupportedBy link that is augmented with a diamond to 
indicate the security control source for the provision set. 
In Figure 5, provision sets flow to the main control from 
related controls and enhancements. The achievement 
weight, 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤, is assigned to all goals. It holds the current 
value calculated at the goal for assessing the satisficing 
level of the main goal as discussed in Section 7.  
Context nodes are connected through an 
InContextOf link (hollow arrow). Context nodes hold 
the assignment tailoring as discussed in Section 3. 
Attached to subgoals, they may hold functional 
requirement weights for how flexible they are to change. 
The strategy connects the main goal by a SupportedBy 
link (filled arrow) to the assurance case argument from 
which the subgoals and solutions extend. Modules 
represent low-level operational goals for argumentation 
related directly to the verification and validation 
processes employed. The triangles mean the node is 
uninstantiated. The joined triangles mean the node is 
both undeveloped and uninstantiated.  
Figure 6 instantiates the security assurance case 
template for AU-5(1) using 800-53A labels. The 
subgoal Req1 is a functional requirement represented by 
an invariant expressed in Linear Temporal Logic, as “it 
is always the case that the audit trail size is less than the 
capacity ratio limit associated with the record storage 
capacity or an alert occurs.” The context nodes in the 
instantiation have the tailoring for capRatioLimit and 
the various alert parameters segregated in Figure 2. AU-
5 holds the capacity value in its provision set for AU-
5(1) that it acquires from its dependency on AU-4. AU-
5(1) assigns the value of capAlert which it provides to 
AU-5. The modules M1-M6 are the operational goals 
related to the process flow for SIMS in Figure 4. 
 
6. Adapting Assurance Cases 
 
To illustrate performing and evaluating an 
adaptation on a security assurance case, we expand 
Module M5 in Figure 6 to show the argument of 
maintaining a satisfactory impact on the checkCapacity 
process. Figure 7 shows the expanded module for M5, 
which has the argument over the proof process of our 
system. The proof process is modeled as operational 
goals to maintain the invariant subgoal from Figure 6.  
We assume the MAPE-K loop planner can describe 
the needed changes to the XML that represents the 
security assurance case and construct the adapted 
assurance cases for A1 through A3 as described in 
Section 4. 
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Figure 6. Security Assurance Case for AU-5(1) 
 
 
Figure 7. Expanded checkCapacity Module  
Adaptation A1 directly affects the assurance case 
for AU-5(1) by changing the capRatioLimit tailored 
value in the context node Context: AU-5(1)[3] of 
Figure 6. Figure 8 reflects the change to the adapted 
Context: AU-5(1)[3] node, where the tailored value 
increases from 75% to 90%. It also includes the XML 
for that context node where the adaptation increases 
capRatioLimit as shown on line 31. The impact to the 
achievement weight is shown on line 34.  
 
 
Figure 8. AU-5(1) with Adaptation A1  
Adaptation A2 introduces a new buffer into the 
Audit component, but AU-5(1)’s assurance case has 
no solution node to satisfy the new subgoal. Because 
there exist security controls that refer to offloading 
audit records to alternate storage, we assume the 
planner can reuse the evidence that such logging is 
sufficient to comply with operation goal G-6.  
Figure 9 reflects the adapted operational goal G-6 
from Figure 7 for adaptation A2. This adaptation 
introduces a new branch for G-6 to be satisfied with an 
argument using an external buffer to store older 
records in the audit trail through G-6(Sub1), G-6(S1), 
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 G-6(EVD1). The XML produced by the planner 
reflects the argument additions. Line 31 shows a 
reduced achievement weight to 0.5, reflecting the 
potential for a negative impact on the goal. The goal 
for the new supporting argument is added at line 34. 
 
 
Figure 9. AU-5(1) with Adaptation A2 
Figure 10 shows the affected operational goals G-
4 and G-6 from Figure 7 due to adaptation A3. The 
adaptation affects G-6 and G-4 by substituting their 
functions with overwriting older records and disabling 
the capacity alert, respectively, to satisfy module M5’s 
goal. The XML lines 31and 35 indicate the reduced 
achievement weights to 0.2 that impact the goal 
specified in line 12. 
 
7. Goal Satisficing Level Determination  
    using Achievement Weights  
 
Maintaining the security control in the self-
adaptive system is a non-functional requirement. 
Using concepts discussed in Section 2, we represent 
each main security control as a softgoal and use the 
subgoals and operational goals from its security 
assurance case to create direct edges that form a 
Softgoal Interdependency Graph (SIG) [18]. The SIG 
results in a tree with only AND relationships. We 
adapt the Soft Goal using Weight (SGW) approach 
[12] to determine the satisficing level of the assurance 
case. A modified vulnerability metric calculation [24] 
provides the achievement weight of each softgoal. 
Satisficing calculations can indicate the impact of an 
adaptation on the security assurance case, including 
propagation of required state values from other 
security controls. The remainder of the section defines 
the formulas and their adaptations from the original 
approaches [12, 24]. We show how the achievement 
weights and satisficing levels are calculated for 
adaptations A1-A3 and the level of satisficing that 
results from each.  
 
 
Figure 10. AU-5(1) with Adaptation A3 
Using the SGW approach [12], we define a 
softgoal interdependency graph, SIGA, for the security 
assurance case, A, as a tree of goals with the main 
security goal, 𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴, as the root. SIGA = (GA, DA) where 
• GA = {𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴} ∪ OA 
• OA = set of subgoals and operational goals for 
A that support the main security control, 𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 
(root) 
• For all goals 𝑔𝑔 ∈ GA, 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤(𝑔𝑔) is the 
achievement weight calculated for that goal. 
• DA = the set of edges (p, c), representing 
dependencies among the parent (p) and child 
(c) goals in SIGA.  
The related security controls introduce inter-
dependencies that form a network of security controls. 
As assurance cases, they only have knowledge of the 
controls on which they depend. However, from the 
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 MAPE-K loop perspective, the inter-dependencies can 
be traversed as an adaptation is evaluated. A partial 
dependency graph appears in Figure 11. The links 
specify the provision sets passed from source 
(diamond) to target control. This expression facilitates 
the propagation impact evaluation of an adaptation. 
The security control network (SCN) = (M, DM), 
where 
• M = {⋃ 𝑚𝑚SIG }, the set of all SIG root goals 
• DM = set of weighted, directed edges with 
provision sets representing dependencies 
among security controls (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Sample Security Control Network   
The community structure advocated by the 
approach in [24] provides for a higher degree of 
influence across the edges. In our representation, a 
security control and its enhancements form a natural 
community, as represented by the green box 
surrounding AU-5 and AU-5(1) in Figure 11. To 
calculate 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤(𝑔𝑔) for 𝑔𝑔 ∈ GA, we measure the 
vulnerabilities of the community structure in the SCN. 
The achievement weight is inversely related to 
community vulnerability as described in [24]. 
Achievement weight is then defined for a SIGA as   
   𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤(𝑔𝑔) = 𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔), for leaf nodes, 𝑔𝑔 ∈ OA 
       = 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣�𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤(𝑐𝑐)�, for all 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑔𝑔) 
    for non-leaf nodes, 𝑔𝑔 ∈ GA 
where 𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔) is the impact factor defined on the state 
variables supporting the operational goals at the SIG 
leaves. Currently, 𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔) must be determined by the 
certifiers prior to deployment given potential changes 
to state variables and the organization’s risk policy.  
Table 1 provides sample values for 𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔) related to 
the state variables affects by adaptations A1-A3. A 
lower value has more negative impact on achievement 
weights. In a community, the control enhancements 
(e.g. AU-5(1)) propagate their achievement weights to 
their community parent (e.g. AU-5) as one of its edges.  
Table 1. Sample Impact Table 
𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔) capRatio
-Limit 
capacity auditTrail insertion- 
Point 
1 = 75 % = 100 Store 
record 
≤ #records 
0.9  > 100   
0.5 < 75% < 100 Offload 
older 
record  
> #records 
0.2 > 75%  Overwrite 
older 
record 
 
0 ≤ 0% or  
≥ 100% 
≤ 0 Drop 
record 
< 0 
Determining the satisficing level of a main control 
softgoal, such as AU-5, relies on the SCN. A partial 
SCN is shown in Figure 11. The satisficing level, 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑚𝑚), of main goal 𝑚𝑚 is the average of achievement 
weights that include 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤(𝑚𝑚) and the 𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏(𝑚𝑚) as 
defined by the direction that the provision sets are 
passed. For example, 𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏(AU-4) = {AU-2, 
AU-5, AU-6, AU-7, AU-11, SI-4} from Figure 1, with 
a subset shown in Figure 11.  Thus, 
         𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑚𝑚) = 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣(𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤(𝑚𝑚)                                                        + ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤(𝑔𝑔)𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏(𝑚𝑚) )  
A control enhancement, 𝑣𝑣, that has a neighbor 
outside of its community can potentially have 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑣𝑣)  ≠ 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤(𝑣𝑣). In this case, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑣𝑣) has priority. 
When security controls are mutually related with the 
same provision, the algorithm cannot double count the 
impact. To resolve this issue, our satisficing algorithm 
preserves the last calculated achievement 
weight, 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝(𝑔𝑔), and uses that achievement weight as 
the neighbor’s achievement weight to stabilize the 
network-based calculation. We assume that when 
deployed, the SIMS security controls have an 
achievement weight of 1. We show how adaptations 
A1-A3 directly lower certain achievement weights and 
propagate the impact through the SCN. 
 
8. Adaptation Results  
 
Table 2 shows the achievement weight changes for 
AU-5’s partial community after applying adaptations 
A1-A3 to the security assurance case for AU-5(1). 
Though we focused on Module M5, other modules are 
also affected by the adaptations and are reflected in 
Table 2. 
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 Table 2. 𝒂𝒂𝒘𝒘(𝒈𝒈) in AU-5 Community 
Goal Base A1 A2 A3 
Opp-G1 1 0.2 1 1 
Opp-G2 1 1 1 1 
Opp-G3 1 1 1 1 
Opp-G4 1 1 1 0.2 
Opp-G5 1 1 0.5 1 
Opp-G6 1 1 0.5 0.2 
M1 1 1 1 1 
M2 1 1 0.5 0.2 
M3 1 1 0.5 0.6 
M4 1 1 1 1 
M5 1 0.867 0.833 0.733 
M6 1 0.867 0.833 0.733 
G1 1 0.956 0.778 0.711 
AU-5(1) 1 0.956 0.778 0.711 
AU-5 1 0.956 0.778 0.711 
Table 3 shows the satisficing level computed for 
each main security control at the base (deployed) level 
and after applying adaptations A1-A3. Note that 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(AU-5(1)) = 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤(AU-5(1)) because the A1-A3 are 
internal to that security control. AU-5 is affected by 
A1-A3 because of its relationship with AU-5(1). The 
effects of A1 and A2 only propagate to AU-5 since the 
adapted provisions remain in the community. 
Adaptation A3 impacts AU-5 and AU-4 because 
capAlert is in the propagated provision set (Figure 11).  
Table 3. Satisficing Levels  
 Base A1 A2 A3 
AU-2 1 1 1 1 
AU-4 1 1 1 0.928 
AU-5 1 0.985 0.926 0.903 
AU-5(1) 1 0.956 0.778 0.711 
AU-11 1 1 1 1 
SI-12 1 1 1 1 
 
9. Adaptation Evaluation 
 
To evaluate the alignment of the adaptive system 
behavior with the satisficing level determination in 
Section 8, we deploy A1-A3 in the SIMS application. 
We embed checkpoints as probes in the checkCapacity 
module (M5 in Figures 6 and 7) and log the effects on 
the audit trail. Figure 12 shows how the checkpoints 
are placed to determine if (i) a record is generated 
(CK1), (ii) the capRatioLimit is maintained (CK2), 
(iii) the audit trail capacity is maintained with 
capability to store a record within the auditTrail 
(CK3), (iv) the alert is properly performed by capAlert 
(CK4), (v) the proper insertionPoint can be found to 
store the next record while maintaining the existing 
auditTrail contents (CK5), and (vi) the record is stored 
in auditTrail (CK6).  
We ran tests with sufficient audit trail capacity and 
insufficient audit trail capacity. With sufficient 
capacity, adaptation A1 performs better than A2 and 
A3. Allowing more records to flow into the audit trail 
is a local change that impacts only a single state 
variable and does not propagate outside the 
community. Thus, A1 is not heavily relied on by the 
assurance case argument or proof for all audit 
functionality. A2 and A3 impact several operational 
goals that are needed for the overall argument or proof. 
Table 4 shows the results with insufficient capacity in 
which the audit trail can hold only 50 records. Column 
1 represents the base deployment (B), followed by the 
adaptations when the number of records needed is 75 
and 100. A1 does poorly with insufficient records. A2 
performs the best but requires addition buffer storage. 
A3 performs worse than A1 overall. A3 fails at CK4 
by disabling capAlert and fails at CK5 when overwrite 
functionality violates the requirement that the 
insertion point maintains the records in the audit trail.  
 
Figure 12. checkCapacity Checkpoints 
Table 4. Performance Evaluation Results 
 #Rec CK1 CK2 CK3 CK4 CK5 CK6 
B  75 75 37 50 75 50 50 
B  100 100 37 50 100 50 50 
A1  75 75 43 50 75 50 50 
A1 100 100 43 50 100 50 50 
A2 75 75 74 50 75 75 75 
A2 100 100 99 50 100 100 100 
A3 75 75 74 50 37 37 75 
A3  100 100 99 50 37 37 100 
 
10. Limitations and Future Work  
 
In this paper, we extend a security assurance case 
template to specify goal achievement weights and 
interdependencies among a network of related security 
controls. The specification introduces the calculation 
of a satisficing level of a security control for a potential 
self-adaptation based on its internal changes and from 
propagated satisficing levels in the network. We 
implement the security assurance cases using XML to 
perform the adaptations and measurements at runtime, 
as demonstrated using a sample application with three 
adaptations and embedded checkpoints. We discuss 
the alignment of the adaptation failure rates with the 
calculated satisficing levels. Using system domain 
knowledge, experts can introduce satisficing level 
thresholds to identify acceptable adaptations.  
Scalability is a potential limitation to the approach 
given the size of the security control network of related 
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 controls for a large-scale system. The XML 
representation can streamline the automated 
assessment process when an adaptation is considered. 
Though codifying the security assurance cases in 
XML is potentially burdensome during design, once 
codified, achievement weight and satisficing level 
determination could be optimized. Evaluating 
scalability will be part of future work, which will also 
examine patterns of applications and adaptations to 
determine the influence the presumed dependencies 
actually have on related controls. 
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